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L Introduction
Few would contradict the assertion that the assessment and collection
of taxes represents a fundamental and recurring source of tension between
the government and the citizens of the United States. Within this realm of
* The author wishes to thank Professor Keith E. Engel and M. Annette Lanning for
their advice, assistance, and encouragement in the development of this Note.
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anxiety and uncertainty, perhaps few discoveries would prove more upsetting
to a taxpayer than to realize that the taxpayer had overpaid taxes, but that
the time for seeking recovery of that payment had elapsed. Taxpayers
unfortunate enough to make such a discovery traditionally have had little
hope of ever obtaining a refund.' Nonetheless, recent judicial developments
suggest that help may be on the horizon, at least for individuals demonstrating persuasive equitable considerations. 2 Yet many courts have not welcomed these developments with open arms, 3 as the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently demonstrated in Webb v. United
States. 4
In Webb, the Fourth Circuit considered the tragic circumstances surrounding the last years of Mary Morton Parsons. 5 An elderly woman who
had inherited considerable wealth early in life, Parsons possessed only a
limited understanding of financial matters.6 Consequently, Parsons relied on
close relatives to manage her personal and financial affairs for her entire
life.7 Following the deaths of her husband in 1970 and of her sister-in-law
in 1972, Parsons hired Dr. Alvin Q. Jarrett, a social acquaintance, to serve
as her personal physician and manager. 8 Jarrett, in turn, hired B. Roland
Freasier, Jr. to serve as Parsons's personal attorney. 9 Over the next fourteen
years, Jarrett and Freasier physically and emotionally abused Parsons, forced
her to move into virtual seclusion, and confined her to her bed through heavy
sedation."0 The two men also convinced Parsons to give each of them power
1. See Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691, 694 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that courts
traditionally have declined to apply equitable principles to toll statutes of limitations),
petitionfor cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1996) (No. 95-1360).
2. See, e.g., Brockamp v. United States, 67 F.3d 260, 263 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
that statute of limitations in tax refund suit may be equitably tolled), cert. granted, 116 S.
Ct. 1875 (1996); Scott v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 1499, 1507-08 (D. Haw. 1993)
(same), aff'd, 70 F.3d 120 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub nom. United States v.
Brockamp, 116 S. Ct. 1875 (1996); Wiltgen v. United States, 813 F. Supp. 1387, 1394-95
(N.D. Iowa 1992) (same); Johnsen v. United States, 758 F. Supp. 834, 836 (E.D.N.Y.

1991) (same).
3. See, e.g., Webb, 66 F.3d at 702 (holding that statute of limitations in tax refund
suit cannot be equitably tolled); Oropallo v. United States, 994 F.2d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 1993)
(same); Vintilla v. United States, 931 F.2d 1444, 1447 (11th Cir. 1991) (same).
4. 66 F.3d 691 (4th Cir. 1995).
5. Webb, 66 F.3d at 692.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of attorney, thereby enabling the men to take total control of her personal
and financial affairs."
During this period, Jarrett and Freasier used their power to fraudulently
divert large sums of Parsons's assets to themselves and to their families.' 2
In 1980, in connection with these conveyances, Jarrett and Freasier filed a
gift tax return on Parsons's behalf and paid gift taxes of $4,324,822.54 out
of Parsons's funds. ' 3 In 1986 and 1987, following an audit by the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), the two men paid more than $7,000,000 from Parsons's assets in additional taxes, penalties, and interest. 14 In the summer of
1987, Parsons discovered these illegal transactions and filed a claim with the
IRS to recover her lost assets." The IRS acknowledged that the gift taxes
were paid wrongfully and refunded $9,844,541.03 to Parsons, which included the taxes and interest paid in 1986 and 1987.16 Nevertheless, the IRS
refused to refund the $4,324,822.54 paid in 1980 because Parsons had not
filed her claim for refund within the statutory limitations period. 17 Parsons's
executors then filed suit in federal district court to recover the improperly
paid taxes. 8 The district court concluded that the statute of limitations
barred the suit and dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 19
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of the
suit.' In so doing, the court specifically rejected the assertion that Parsons's
incapacity equitably tolled the statute of limitations. 2 ' The court's decision
thus allowed the United States to keep a $4.32 million windfall at Parsons's
expense. 2
The outcome of Webb and similar cases raises the question of whether
courts should continue to adhere to this traditional approach when it leads to
such seemingly harsh results. Three days after the decision in Webb, the
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
Id.

14. Id.
15. Id. at 693.

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19.

Id.

20. Id. at 702; see also infra Part V.C (discussing Fourth Circuit's analysis in Webb).
21. Webb, 66 F.3d at 694-702; see also infra Part V.C (discussing Fourth Circuit's
rationale for rejecting equitable tolling in tax refund suits).
22. See Webb, 66 F.3d at 702-03 (Russell, J., dissenting) (noting that government was
unintentional beneficiary of fraud).
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United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit answered this question
in the negative, thereby creating a split of opinion in the circuit courts of
appeals.' In Brockamp v. United States,24 the Ninth Circuit held that a
taxpayer's mental incapacity, if proved, could equitably toll the statute of
limitations governing tax refund suits.' The Government appealed the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Brockamp, however, and the United States
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari.'
In anticipation of the Supreme Court's resolution of this debate, this
Note explores the history and rationale behind the strict enforcement of the
statute of limitations in tax refund suits and offers its own conclusions about
whether the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply in such cases. Toward this end, Part II of this Note discusses the underlying rationales for
both statutes of limitations and the equitable doctrines designed to mitigate
their sometimes harsh effects. Part II then provides a basic discussion of
the particular statutory provisions that govern tax refund suits. Part IV
considers the Supreme Court decisions informing this issue, and Part V
discusses the lower courts' subsequent attempts to resolve this question in
light of the Court's decisions. Based on the results of this analysis, this
Note concludes by discussing the proper role for equitable tolling in tax
refund suits and by defining the constraints on the use of that doctrine in
such cases.
HI. Statutes of Limitations
Statutory limitations on the time in which a claimant may file suit now
govern almost all forms of public and private actions within the United
States.27 The central rationale underlying statutes of limitations is a desire
to promote fairness to defendants .' Statutes of limitations further this goal
23. See Brockamp v. United States, 67 F.3d 260, 263 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that
statute of limitations in tax refund suit may be equitably tolled), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct.

1875 (1996).
24. 67 F.3d 260 (9th Cir. 1995).
25. See Brockamp, 67 F.3d at 263; see also infra notes 183-202 and accompanying
text (discussing Brockamp).

26. See United States v. Brockamp, 116 S. Ct. 1875 (1996) (granting certiorari).
27. See Developments in the Law - Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177,
1179 (1950) [hereinafter Developments] (discussing prevalence of statutes of limitations in
modern law).
28. See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (discussing
purposes of statutes of limitations). In Burnett, the Supreme Court stated:
Statutes of limitations are primarily designed to assure fairness to defendants.
Such statutes "promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of
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by providing that, after a given period of time, an individual can expect that
the slate will be wiped clean and that she will not be forced to defend

herself against claims involving evidence or testimony that has become lost
or unreliable due to the passage of time.29 Similarly, statutes of limitations

relieve courts of the burden of adjudicating stale or tenuous claims with
respect to which judicial effectiveness may be undermined. 0
Although statutes of limitations governing actions between private
parties and the sovereign further these policies, the underlying rationales for

such provisions arise from slightly different considerations. 3 In particular,
statutory limitations on private claims asserted against the sovereign mostly
serve to further public and administrative convenience.32 Thus, in interpreting the statutes of limitations governing tax refund suits, courts generally
focus more on the competing policies of finality and correctness than on
33
concerns about the government's ability to defend itself.

By providing specific periods of time in which a taxpayer may commence a tax refund suit, the statutory limitations governing such actions promote finality in the law.'

According to the United States Supreme Court:

It probably would be all but intolerable, at least Congress has regarded
it as ill-advised, to have an income tax system under which there never

claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has
a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the
period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to
prevail over the right to prosecute them."
Id. (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342,
348-49 (1944)); see also Developments, supra note 27, at 1185 (discussing purposes of
statutes of limitations).
29. See Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428 (discussing purposes of statutes of limitations); see
also Developments, supra note 27, at 1185 (same).
30. See Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428 (discussing purposes of statutes of limitations). The
Burnett Court noted that "the courts ought to be relieved of the burden of trying stale claims
when a plaintiff has slept on his rights." Id.; see also Developments, supra note 27, at 1185
(same).
31. See Developments, supra note 27, at 1186 (noting distinction between statutes of
limitations governing most actions and statutes governing actions between private parties and
sovereign).
32. Id.
33. See James E. Tierney, Equitable RecoupmentRevisited: The Scope of the Doctrine
in FederalTax Cases after United States v. Dalm, 80 Ky. L.J. 95, 95 (1991) (discussing competing policies underlying statutes of limitations in tax refund cases). But see infra note 35
and accompanying text (indicating that courts should still consider fairness to government).
34. Tierney, supra note 33, at 95.
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would come a day of final settlement and which required both the taxpayer and the Government to stand ready forever and a day to produce
vouchers, prove events, establish values and recall details of all that goes

into an income tax contest. Hence, a statute of limitation is an almost
indispensable element of
fairness as well as of practical administration of
35
an income tax policy.

In matters of taxation, as in most areas of the law, the price of
this finality is correctness. 36 Frequently, one can discover the inaccurate
treatment of a particular matter only after the passage of time.37 Nevertheless, if the discovery occurs after the statute of limitations has run, both
the government and private litigants lack a remedy for correcting that

error.3 ' Failure to rectify such a problem not only offends the desire for

accuracy, but also may contribute to future inequity. 39 Because the federal

tax system functions on a temporal basis rather than a transactional basis,
an unrectified error made in one tax year, if treated properly in another,
may result in either double taxation or no taxation, depending on the circumstances

.'o

Recognizing the inequities that statutes of limitations impose on the tax
system, courts have developed several doctrines to alleviate the impact of
those inequities. 4 In particular, on different occasions and to varying
35. Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 301 (1946) (discussing
important role played by statutes of limitations in federal tax system).
36. See Tierney, supra note 33, at 96 (discussing effects of statutes of limitations).
37. Id. at 97.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. The following example illustrates how double taxation might occur:
Assume, for example, that a cash-method taxpayer erroneously, but in good
faith, believes that an item of gross income actually received in 1991 was
constructively received in 1990. She thus includes the item on her 1990 federal
income tax return filed April 15, 1991 and omits it from her 1991 return, filed
April 15, 1992. On these facts, the taxpayer ordinarily must file a refund claim
for 1990 on or before April 15, 1994, but the government will have until April
15, 1995 to determine a deficiency for 1991. Thus, if the government asserts an
income tax deficiency for 1991 based on this item between April 15, 1994 and
April 15, 1995, that determination will be timely and effective, even though,
strictly applying the statute of limitations, the taxpayer will be barred from
claiming a refund of the tax overpaid for 1990 resulting from the erroneous
inclusion of the item in income for that year.
Id. at 97-98 n.8; see also Hoffman F. Fuller, Finality and Equity in Tax Litigation, 10 AM.
J. TAX POL'Y 51, 51-52 (1992) (discussing inequities created by statutes of limitations given
temporal nature of federal tax system).
41. See Tierney, supra note 33, at 100 (discussing judicial development of equitable
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degrees, courts have invoked the doctrines of equitable recoupment, equitable estoppel, and equitable tolling to mitigate the inequities resulting from
the strict application of statutes of limitations in tax-related cases.42 Although each doctrine operates to introduce an element of fairness where it
otherwise would be lacking, the rationale and function of each doctrine
arise from unique considerations.'

Equitable recoupment, the first of these judicial doctrines, permits the
use of a time-barred claim as a defense to a tax-related claim commenced

in a timely manner if both claims arise from the same transaction.' This
doctrine specifically responds to the inequities created by the temporal
nature of the tax system. 5 To achieve its purpose, equitable recoupment
doctrines).
42. See Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 251-63 (1935) (applying doctrine of
equitable recoupment to permit taxpayer's otherwise time-barred claim for recovery of
previously paid estate taxes); Brockamp v. United States, 67 F.3d 260, 261-63 (9th Cir.
1995) (applying doctrine of equitable tolling to allow taxpayer to assert claim for refund of
erroneously paid taxes that statute of limitations otherwise would have barred), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 1875 (1996); Miller v. United States, 500 F.2d 1007, 1011 (2d Cir.
1974) (applying doctrine of equitable estoppel to prevent government from disallowing claim
when taxpayers had reasonably relied on mistaken government action that indicated deadline
for filing claim had been extended).
43. See infra notes 44-64 and accompanying text (discussing theoretical distinctions
among three equitable doctrines).
44. See Bull, 295 U.S. at 261-62 (discussing equitable recoupment); see also Arthur
W. Andrews, Modem-Day Equitable Recoupment and the "Two Tax Effect:" Avoidance of
the Statutes of Limitations in Federal Tax Controversies,28 ARIz. L. REv. 595, 598-615
(1986) (detailing evolution and refinement of doctrine of equitable recoupment by Supreme
Court); Tierney, supra note 33, at 101-16 (same). Although the doctrine of equitable
recoupment usually is invoked by taxpayers, the Supreme Court has held that the government may invoke the doctrine when appropriate in defense to tax refund suits. See Stone
v. White, 301 U.S. 532, 539 (1937) (extending right to invoke doctrine of equitable
recoupment to government).
45. See Andrews, supra note 44, at 600 (discussing rationale for equitable recoupment); see also Bull, 295 U.S. at 261 (discussing need for doctrine of equitable recoupment
to protect taxpayer's rights). In Bull, the Supreme Court considered a case involving double
taxation:
[Tihe Government brought a new proceeding arising out of the same transaction
involved in the earlier proceeding [involving estate taxes]. This time, however,
its claim was for income tax. The taxpayer opposed payment in full, by demanding recoupment of the amount mistakenly collected as estate tax and wrongfully
retained .... The United States, we have held, cannot, as against the claim of
an innocent party, hold his money which has gone into its treasury by means of
the fraud of its agent. While here the money was taken through mistake without
any element of fraud, the unjust retention is immoral and amounts in law to a
fraud on the taxpayer's rights.
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permits courts to consider certain time-barred claims.'

However, as a

matter of policy the doctrine does not conflict with the central purposes
underlying statutes of limitations because the time-barred claim must be

asserted in an already existing action.47 Thus, the doctrine does not undermine the goal of finality because, by bringing the initial action, the defen-

dant in the recoupment claim (the claimant in the initial action) has demonstrated that the treatment of the issue has not been fimalized. Moreover,

considering a claim for recoupment arising from the same transaction does
not create an excessive burden on the judiciary because the court already
must adjudicate at least one aspect of that transaction. Today, courts
invoke equitable recoupment primarily in cases involving the assessment of
two different types of taxes on a single transaction.'
Equitable estoppel, the second judicial doctrine, protects a claimant
who reasonably relied on a representation made by the defendant that

induced the claimant to take or to refrain from taking action to the claimId. (citations omitted); see also supra note 40 (providing example of how temporal structure
of tax system can result in double taxation).
46. See Bull, 295 U.S. at 261-62 (discussing equitable recoupment).
47. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text (discussing purposes of statutes of
limitations).
48. See Andrews, supra note 44, at 623-24 (discussing situations in which equitable
recoupment could be invoked); see also Tierney, supra note 33, at 104-08 (discussing Bull
v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935)). To understand how equitable recoupment operates,
consider this simplified version of the facts in Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935),
in which the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of equitable recoupment permitted
adjudication of a refund claim that the statute of limitations otherwise barred. Bull, 295
U.S. at 258. A member of a lucrative partnership died in February 1920. Id. at 251. By
agreement, the partner's estate continued to receive his share of profits from the partnership
for one year following his death. Id. The partner's share of profits for 1920 consisted of
$24,000 accrued prior to his death and $212,000 accrued thereafter. Id. at 252. The
partnership paid $200,000 to the decedent's estate in 1920 and $12,000 to the estate in 1921.
Id. In the estate tax return, the decedent's interest in the partnership was valued at $24,000.
Id. However, the Commissioner determined that the entire $236,000 received actually
represented the value of the decedent's interest, and the estate therefore paid taxes on that
basis. Id. In 1921, the estate filed an income tax return for 1920 that did not account for
the $200,000 received from the partnership because that amount already had been subject
to taxation. Id. In 1925, the Commissioner notified the estate of a deficiency in income
taxes for 1920. Id. This deficiency was calculated in part based on the $200,000. Id. The
lower court found that the $200,000 constituted income and thus upheld the income tax
assessment based on that amount. Id. at 253. The estate was therefore forced to pay taxes
twice on the $200,000. Id. Without the doctrine of equitable recoupment, the statute of
limitations barred any claim for recovery of the estate taxes erroneously paid in 1920. Id.
at 258. However, in Bull, the Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of equitable recoupment
and permitted the taxpayer to credit the estate taxes previously paid against the deficiency
in income taxes asserted by the Commissioner. Id. at 251-63.

EQUITABLE TOLLING IN TAX REFUND SUITS

1579

ant's detriment.49 Traditionally, equitable estoppel requires the presence of
three elements: "(1) words, acts, conduct or acquiescence causing another
to believe in the existence of a certain state of things; (2) wilfulness or
negligence with regard to the acts, conduct or acquiescence; and (3) detrimental reliance by the other party upon the state of things so indicated."50
In suits against the government, the claimant bears a heavier burden to
demonstrate equitable circumstances than in cases involving only private
parties. 5 The Supreme Court has noted that it has "reversed every finding
of estoppel [against the government]" that the Court has reviewed. 2 Nonetheless, lower courts have applied the doctrine in several tax refund suits
in which appropriate circumstances justified doing so.53 Although equitable
estoppel thus allows a claimant to escape the effects of the statute of limitations, the doctrine presents little conflict with respect to the underlying
rationales of such provisions.54 Equitable estoppel focuses on the actions
of the defendant and permits a court to strip the defendant of the statute's
protection only when the defendant engaged in conduct that would justify
such a step. 5 Consequently, defendants who wish to rely on the protection
of the statute need only to refrain from such egregious behavior.
Equitable tolling, the third judicial doctrine and the subject of this
Note, permits a taxpayer to initiate an action after the expiration of the
statute of limitations when neither the taxpayer nor the government is at
fault for the lack of a timely claim. 6 Equitable tolling does not apply to a
specific factual scenario; rather, a diverse array of equitable considerations
may justify the use of the doctrine. Nonetheless, in all of the cases in
49. See Bokum v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1136, 1141 (11th Cir. 1993) (discussing
equitable'estoppel); see also Developments, supra note 27, at 1222-23 (same).
50. Bokum, 992 F.2d at 1141 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
51. Id.
52. Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 422 (1990), quoted
in Bokum, 992 F.2d at 1141.
53. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 500 F.2d 1007, 1011 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding
that Government was estopped from asserting that statute of limitations barred taxpayer's
claim); Southeast Bank of Orlando v. United States, 676 F.2d 660, 664 (Cl. Ct. 1982)
(same); Heath v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 582, 584-85 (1979) (same).
54. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text (discussing purposes of statutes of
limitations).
55. See Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450-51 (7th Cir. 1990)
(discussing doctrine of equitable estoppel).
56. See id. at 451-53 (discussing doctrine of equitable tolling).
57. See Developments, supra note 27, at 1229-33 (discussing factors that may toll
statutes of limitations). Infancy, insanity, imprisonment, and death are factors that courts
may consider in deciding whether to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling. Id.
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which tolling might apply, the underlying rationale for the doctrine arises

from the belief that a claimant should not be barred from asserting his
rights because he was incapable of taking the requisite steps to protect them

in a timely manner.58 Thus, in contrast to recoupment and estoppel,
equitable tolling focuses on the actions or characteristics of the claimant
rather than on the conduct of the defendant.59 As a result, equitable tolling

presents a greater conflict with the policies underlying statutes of limitations
than either estoppel or recoupment.

°

In the latter two doctrines, the de-

fendant has acted in some way that results in the waiver or loss of the
statutory protection.6' In equitable tolling, a claimant is permitted to assert

an otherwise time-barred claim even if the defendant is blameless. 2 Because tax laws are technical in nature and tax refund suits rely on a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, courts traditionally have refused to
apply the doctrine of equitable tolling in such cases.63 However, recent
judicial developments suggest that courts may be moving away from this

traditional approach.' 4

58. See Cada, 920 F.2d at 451-53 (discussing purposes of equitable tolling).
59. See Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1995)
(contrasting doctrine of equitable tolling with doctrine of equitable estoppel). In Supermail
Cargo, the Ninth Circuit distinguished equitable tolling from equitable estoppel by noting
"that the former focuses on the plaintiffs excusable ignorance of the limitations period and
the lack of prejudice to the defendant, while the latter usually focuses on the actions of the
defendant." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
60. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text (discussing purposes of statutes of
limitations).
61. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine of equitable
recoupment); supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine of equitable
estoppel).
62. See Tregenza v. Great Am. Communications Co., 12 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir.
1993) (distinguishing equitable estoppel from equitable tolling)., In Tregenza, Chief Judge
Posner noted that "[e]quitable tolling just means that without fault by either party the
plaintiff does not have enough information to sue within the period of limitations." Id.
(emphasis added).
63. See Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691, 694 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing traditional approach that statute of limitations governing tax refund suits may not be equitably
tolled), petitionfor cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1996)(No. 95-1360); see
also infra Part IV.A (same).
64. See, e.g., Brockamp v. United States, 67 F.3d 260, 263 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
that statute of limitations in tax refund suit can be equitably tolled), cert. granted, 116 S.
Ct. 1875 (1996); Scott v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 1499, 1507-08 (D. Haw. 1993)
(same), aff'd, 70 F.3d 120 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub nom. United States v.
Brockamp, 116 S. Ct. 1875 (1996); Wiltgen v. United States, 813 F. Supp. 1387, 1394-95
(N.D. Iowa 1992) (same); Johnsen v. United States, 758 F. Supp. 834, 836 (E.D.N.Y.
1991) (same).
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Ilf. The Statutory Framework

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1), federal courts may exercise jurisdiction
over actions relating to any tax alleged to have been assessed or collected
erroneously.' However, prior to bringing suit under § 1346, a taxpayer
must file a claim for refund with the IRS as required by 26 U.S.C.
§ 7422(a).1 Moreover, 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a) limits the period for making

this claim by requiring a taxpayer to assert a tax refund claim: (1) within
three years from the time a return was filed or within two years from the
time the tax was paid, whichever date is later; or (2) if no return was filed,

within two years from the time the tax was paid.67 While § 6511(a) determines when a claim must be filed, § 6511(b) imposes statutory limits on
65. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1994) (granting district courts broad jurisdiction over
tax refund actions). Section 1346(a)(1) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United
States Court of Federal Claims, of ... [a]ny civil action against the United
States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been
collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any
manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws.
Id.; see also United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 601-02 (1990) (discussing statutory
structure governing tax refund suits).
66. See 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (1994) (requiring claimant to file claim with IRS prior
to commencing suit). Section 7422(a) provides:
No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any
internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or
of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary,
according to the provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations of the
Secretary established in pursuance thereof.
Id.; see also Dam, 494 U.S. at 601-02 (discussing statutory structure governing tax refund
suits).
67. See 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a) (1994) (defining time period in which taxpayer must file
claim). Section 6511(a) provides:
Claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any tax imposed by this title in
respect of which tax the taxpayer is required to file a return shall be filed by the
taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the
time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later, or if no return
was filed by the taxpayer, within 2 years from the time the tax was paid. Claim
for credit or refund of an overpayment of any tax imposed by this title which is
required to be paid by means of a stamp shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3
years from the time the tax was paid.
Id.; see also Daln, 494 U.S. at 601-02 (discussing statutory structure governing tax refund

suits).
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when a credit or refund may be recovered. 68 In particular, § 651 1(b)(1)

prohibits a credit or refund from being granted after the expiration of either
the three- or two-year limitations period set forth in § 6511(a), whichever
is applicable to a particular situation.69 In addition, § 6511(b)(2) limits the
amount of refund or recovery both in cases in which § 6511(a) has been

satisfied as well as in cases in which it has not been satisfied.7"

Read

together, the various provisions of § 6511 address a wide range of circumstances and place distinct limits on the recovery of a tax refund.7"
68. See 26 U.S.C. § 6511(b) (1994) (limiting allowance of credit or refunds).
69. See id. § 6511(b)(1) (prohibiting recovery unless taxpayer files claim within
prescribed period). Section 6511(b)(1) provides:
Filing of claim within prescribed period
No credit or refund shall be allowed or made after the expiration of the period
of limitation prescribed in subsection (a) for the filing of a claim for credit or
refund, unless a claim for credit or refund is filed by the taxpayer within such
period.
Id.
70. See id. § 6511(b)(2) (limiting amount of credit or refund). Section 6511(b)(2)
provides:
Limit on amount of credit or refund
(A) Limit where claim filed within 3-year period
If the claim was filed by the taxpayer during the 3-year period prescribed in
subsection (a), the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of
the tax paid within the period, immediately preceding the filing of the claim,
equal to 3 years plus the period of any extension of time for filing the return.
If the tax was required to be paid by means of a stamp, the amount of the credit
or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the 3 years immediately preceding the filing of the claim.
(B) Limit where claim not filed within 3-year period
If the claim was not filed within such 3-year period, the amount of the credit or
refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid during the 2 years immediately
preceding the filing of the claim.
(C) Limit if no claim filed
If no claim was filed, the credit or refund shall not exceed the amount which
would be allowable under subparagraph (A) or (B), as the case may be, if claim
was filed on the date the credit or refund is allowed.
Id.
71. To understand the interplay among the provisions of § 6511, consider a hypothetical individual who made a tax payment on May 1, 1990, but failed to file a return in
connection with this payment until June 1, 1991. This taxpayer then discovered on May 15,
1994 that she overpaid her taxes and had a valid claim for a tax refund. Under § 6511(a),
she could file a claim with the IRS anytime on or before June 1, 1994. If she failed to do
so, § 6511(a) and § 6511(b)(1) would bar her from recovery. Assume this taxpayer filed
her claim for refund on May 15, 1994 when she discovered her overpayment. The taxpayer
therefore satisfied § 6511(a) and § 6511(b)(1) by asserting her claim within three years of
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IV. The Confusion Createdby the Supreme Court
A. The TraditionalApproach
Until recently, courts uniformly had rejected the doctrine of equitable

tolling in tax refund suits.'

The principal rationale for this strict approach

arises from the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 73 The Supreme Court most
recently discussed the significance of sovereign immunity with respect to

tax refund suits in United States v. Dalm,74 a tax refund case involving the
doctrine of equitable recoupment.75
In Dalm, the Supreme Court considered whether a taxpayer could
maintain a suit for a refund of overpaid gift taxes under the doctrine of

equitable recoupment despite the expiration of the statute of limitations. 76

Francis Dalm served as administrator of the estate of her former employer
and received two payments as fees for her services.'

The decedent's

brother also gave Dalm two large payments in the form of gifts from the
estate. 78 After auditing Dalm, the IRS asserted that the two gifts repre-

sented additional payments for her services as administrator and therefore
required Dalm to pay income taxes on these payments. 79 Daim petitioned

the Tax Court for a redetermination of the asserted deficiencies, but the IRS
and Dalm settled the case after two days of trial.8" Although Dam agreed

to pay certain stipulated amounts, she made no claim in the Tax Court and
received no offsetting credit for the gift taxes that she previously had paid.8 '
when she filed her return. Nevertheless, the taxpayer could still not recover a refund
because § 6511(b)(2)(A) limits the recovery or refund to the amount of taxes actually paid
during the three-year period prior to the filing of the claim. Thus, in order to satisfy
§ 6511(b)(2)(A), the taxpayer would have had to discover the overpayment and file her
claim on or before May 1, 1993.
72. See Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691, 694-95 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing
traditional rejection of equitable tolling in tax refund suits based on concerns of sovereign
immunity), petitionfor cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1996) (No. 95-1360).
73. Id. at 694.
74. 494 U.S. 596 (1990).
75. United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608-10 (1990) (holding that doctrine of
equitable recoupment cannot create jurisdiction in tax refund case after expiration of statute
of limitations).
76. Id. at 598.
77. Id. at 598-99.
78. Id. at 599.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. Significantly, at the time the Supreme Court decided Daln, it was widely
believed that the Tax Court could not exercise jurisdiction over a claim for recoupment.
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Immediately after settling this income tax dispute, Dalm filed a claim with
the IRS for a refund of the gift tax payments.'2 When the IRS failed to act

on this claim, Dalm brought suit in the district court.'

The district court

granted the Government's motion for summary judgment on the ground that

the statute of limitations jurisdictionally barred the action. 4 On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that Dalm's
claim satisfied all of the requirements of equitable recoupment and reversed
the district court's dismissal of the case.'
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the statute of limitations
barred Dalm's claim.86 The Court examined the statutory provisions

restricting the time and manner in which a taxpayer may file a claim or
bring a suit and concluded that, read together, the provisions permitted only
those actions involving claims made within the time limits of § 6511. The
Court explained that under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, "the United
States, as sovereign, 'is immune from suit, save as it consents to be
sued . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that

court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit."' 88 When Congress enacts a statute

of limitations to govern a particular type of claim or cause of action, that

provision represents one of the terms of the government's consent to be

sued.89 Thus, according to the Dalm Court, courts should not extend

lightly the government's waiver of sovereign immunity beyond the limit that
Congress intended.'

The Supreme Court therefore concluded that the

doctrine of equitable recoupment cannot provide a court with independent
See id. at 614-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for not considering this
issue). Thus, Dalm's decision not to make a claim for a setoff or refund in the Tax Court
proceedings seemed perfectly logical. Id.at 615 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Three years
later, in Estate ofMueller v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 551 (1993), the Tax Court reconsidered this issue in light of Dalm and concluded that the Tax Court can exercise jurisdiction
over claims of recoupment in tax deficiency actions. Mueller, 101 T.C. at 557. The
holding in Mueller therefore greatly reduces any inequities that might result from future
application of the rule announced by the Supreme Court in Dalm.
82. Dalm, 494 U.S. at 599.
83. Id.at 600.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.at 601.
87. Id.at 602; see also supra Part EIl (discussing statutes governing tax refund suits).
88. Dalm, 494 U.S. at 608 (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)
(quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941))).
89. Id.
90. Id.
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jurisdiction over a suit in which a taxpayer asserted a claim for recoupment
after the expiration of the statute of limitations. 9
Although Dalm addressed the issue of sovereign immunity in the
context of equitable recoupment, courts have followed a similar approach
with respect to the doctrine of equitable tolling in tax refund suits.' Thus,
the principle of sovereign immunity traditionally has precluded claimants
from overcoming the statute of limitations in tax refund suits on equitable
grounds. However, less than a year after the Supreme Court issued its
decision in Dalm, the Court dramatically altered its approach to the doctrine
of equitable tolling in suits against the government.'
B. The Irwin Decision
In Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 9' the Supreme Court
considered whether the expiration of the statute of limitations jurisdictionally barred an individual's complaint alleging violations of his civil rights
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Irwin asserted that the
Veterans' Administration improperly dismissed him from his job.96 After
exhausting his administrative remedies, Irwin filed suit in district court in
May 1987.' He did so, however, forty-four days after his attorney had
received a letter of notification from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission; thus, Irwin filed suit after the applicable thirty-day statute of
limitations had expired. 9 Irwin nonetheless asserted that the statute of
limitations had been tolled because his attorney had been out of the country
91. Id. at 611. The Dalm Court distinguished Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247
(1935), on the grounds that the taxpayer in Bull asserted the tax refund claim in an already
existing action over which the court had proper jurisdiction. Dalm, 494 U.S. at 602-08; see
also Bull, 295 U.S. at 261-63 (holding that equitable recoupment permitted adjudication of
claim for tax refund). In contrast, the taxpayer in Dalm sought to use the doctrine of
equitable recoupment as the sole basis for an independent action for a tax refund. Dalm,
494 U.S. at 606.
92. See Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691, 694 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing traditional reluctance to toll statute of limitations in tax refund suits due to concerns of sovereign
immunity), petitionfor cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1996) (No. 95-1360).
93. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990) (declaring new rule that rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applies in suits against government).
94. 498 U.S. 89 (1990).
95. Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 92 (1990).
96. Id. at 91.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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and Irwin had filed suit within thirty days of the date on which he personally received notice. 99
In addressing whether the doctrine of equitable tolling applied in this
case, the Supreme Court reiterated its longstanding position that a statute
of limitations constitutes a condition to the waiver of sovereign immunity
by the government. "' In contrast with Dalm, however, the Irwin Court
concluded that applying the doctrine of equitable tolling to suits against the
government would constitute, at most, only a minimal broadening of the
congressional waiver of sovereign immunity. 1 I The Court therefore
announced a new general rule to govern the application of equitable tolling
in suits against the government. 10 In particular, the Irwin Court held that
a rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applies in suits against the
United States in the same way that it applies in suits against private individuals." 3 Despite the adoption of this new rule, the Court concluded that the
facts presented in Irwin did not justify tolling the statute of limitations."4
The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the dismissal of Irwin's complaint."
Although the Supreme Court announced a new rule of general applicability, the Court failed to define clearly the scope of the Irwin decision."
Significantly, the Court acknowledged that "our previous cases dealing with
the effect of time limits in suits against the Government have not been
entirely consistent, even though the cases may be distinguished on their
facts.""'

The recognition of this inconsistency suggests that the Court

might have reached different results in prior cases addressing this issue if
it had applied the Irwin rule; nevertheless, Irwin did not explicitly overrule
any precedent.0 8
In the context of tax refund suits, the Supreme Court's failure to define
the scope of the Irwin rule has proved especially troublesome." By not
99. Id. at 92-93.
100. Id. at 94.
101. Id. at 95. The Irwin Court stated that "making the rule of equitable tolling
applicable to suits against the Government, in the same way that it is applicable to private
suits, amounts to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver." Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 95-96.
104. Id. at 96.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 94.
108. See id. at 98 (White, J., concurring) (noting that majority essentially overruled at
least one prior Supreme Court decision).
109. See infra Part V (discussing difficulty lower courts have encountered in attempting
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discussing Dalm, which the Court decided only nine months prior to Irwin,
the Court left unresolved whether Irwin overruled Dalm or whether the two
cases could be reconciled."' As tax refund cases involving the doctrine of
equitable tolling have begun to proliferate after Irwin, lower courts have
struggled with the proper approach to this issue."'
V. The Debate in the Lower Courts
A. The InitialRejection of the Irwin Rule
The traditional reluctance of courts to apply principles of equitable
tolling in tax refund suits continued to be evident in the initial decisions of
the circuit courts following Irwin."' In Vintilla v. United States,113 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit clearly favored the
strict approach taken inDalm over the rule announced in Irwin."4 Vintilla
worked for a Venezuelan subsidiary of the United States Steel Corporation
(U.S. Steel)." 5 After the subsidiary terminated Vintilla in 1978, he received a severance benefit in the form of a lump sum payment in accordance with Venezuelan law." 6 U.S. Steel claimed that this benefit represented an advance payment of Vintilla's retirement benefits and thus offset
the payment against Vintilla's monthly benefits. 7 In 1983, Vintilla and
other former employees sued U.S. Steel, alleging that U.S. Steel acted
wrongfully in deducting their severance payments from their retirement
benefits. 8 During this period, the IRS determined that Vintilla and his
wife failed to declare the severance payment as income in 1978 and therefore required the Vintillas to pay additional income taxes on this amount.1 9
Before making the payment, the Vintillas informed the IRS of the pending
suit, and the IRS allegedly assured them that it would refund their taxes if
to apply Irwin).
110. See infra Part VI.A (analyzing relationship between Irwin and Dalm).
111. See infra Part V (discussing lower courts' attempts to resolve this issue).
112. See generally Oropallo v. United States, 994 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1993) (rejecting
doctrine of equitable tolling in tax refund suits); Vintilla v. United States, 931 F.2d 1444
(11th Cir. 1991) (same).
113. 931 F.2d 1444 (11th Cir. 1991).
114. See Vintilla, 931 F.2d at 1446-47 (holding that district court could not exercise
jurisdiction over tax refund suit when statute of limitations had expired).
115. Id. at 1445.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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the suit was unsuccessful."

In 1987, after the end of the unsuccessful

litigation, the Vintillas filed a claim with the IRS for a refund of the erroneously assessed tax payment."I

When the IRS failed to respond, the

Vintilas commenced an action in court for the recovery of the payments.l"
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the statute of limitations

jurisdictionally barred the Vintillas' suit.l'I The court emphasized Dalm's
focus on sovereign immunity and the jurisdictional nature of the statute of

limitations in suits against the government. M" The only discussion of Irwin
occurred in a footnote in which the Eleventh Circuit noted that the Supreme
Court failed to reconcile its holding in Irwin with the contradictory language in Dalm.1 In addition, the court of appeals cited a discussion in the
Irwin opinion about two limited circumstances in which the Supreme Court
had permitted equitable tolling of a statute of limitations and concluded that
the Vintillas did not qualify under either of those exceptions. 1" Thus,
according to the Eleventh Circuit, Irwin did little to change the traditional

position that taxpayers may not invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling in
tax refund suits. 27
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1446-47. The court of appeals also dismissed two additional arguments
asserted by the Vintillas. Id. First, the court concluded that the Vintillas' oral notification
to the IRS made within the statute of limitations period did not qualify as filing a claim. Id.
at 1446. Second, the court rejected the assertion that the "law of the case" doctrine applied
to the facts of the case. Id. at 1447.
124. Id. at 1446.
125. Id. at 1447 n.1.
126. Id. The Eleventh Circuit noted:
The Irwin court went on ...to opine that the equitable relief concerning limitations periods typically afforded private litigants in federal courts is sparse. "We
have allowed equitable tolling in situations where the claimant has actively
pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory
period, or where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary's
misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass." The Vintillas do not claim
to fit into either of these categories.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96
(1990)).
127. But see First Alabama Bank v. United States, 981 F.2d 1226, 1228 (1lth Cir.
1993) (assuming arguendo that statute of limitations in tax refund suit could be equitably
tolled but dismissing claim because facts did not justify tolling). In FirstAlabama Bank, the
Eleventh Circuit considered whether the applicable statute of limitations jurisdictionally
barred a tax refund suit. Id. at 1227. Interestingly, the court of appeals cited neither Dalm
nor Vimila in addressing the question of equitable tolling; rather, the court cited Irwin and
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B. The Analogy to Securities Law
In Oropallo v. United States,1 8 the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit joined the Eleventh Circuit in rejecting the doctrine of
equitable tolling in tax refund suits.129 During 1983, Charles Oropallo
worked for Raytheon Service Company.1 31 In 1985, Oropallo was incarcerated.' 3' Four years later, the IRS informed Oropallo that he had failed to
file tax returns since 1982.2 After obtaining his W-2 form from Raytheon
and completing his 1983 return, Oropallo discovered that he had overpaid
his taxes for that year.1 33 In March 1990, he filed his return and asserted
a claim for a tax refund."M The IRS mailed Oropallo a notice denying his
claim for relief and informing him that he could sue within two years from
the date of the notice. 5 Oropallo then filed suit, alleging that "extremely
mitigating and extenuating circumstances" prevented him from filing his
1983 tax return on time. 136 In particular, Oropallo asserted three arguments. First, he believed a six-year statute of limitations period applied. 37
Second, in March 1983, Oropallo suffered carbon monoxide poisoning that
left him incapacitated for several years and unaware that he had not filed
his 1983 tax return. 38 Third, during his incarceration, the prison authorities impeded his legal efforts, and he therefore did not receive notice of his
failure to file until 1989.'Y9 The district court dismissed the action for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.Y'4
assumed "arguendothat the statute of limitations governing tax refund suits, [in this case]
26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(1), may under some circumstances be equitably tolled." Id. at 1228.
Although the court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case on factual
grounds, the court's dicta suggest that if presented with this issue again, the court might
reconsider its decision in Vintilla. See id. (noting that Irwin created presumption of
equitable tolling in suits against government).
128. 994 F.2d 25 (lst Cir. 1993).
129. See Oropallo v. United States, 994 F.2d 25, 26-31 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that
statute of limitations in tax refund suit cannot be equitably tolled).
130. Id. at 25.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 26.
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On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal and stated that the
statute of limitations barred Oropallo's suit.41 The First Circuit, however,
employed a theoretical analysis different from the Eleventh Circuit's ap-

proach in Vintilla.42 In particular, the First Circuit found that the presump-

tion of equitable tolling announced in Irwin applied to tax refund suits, but
the court concluded that the statutory framework governing such suits
served to rebut that presumption. 43 The court of appeals reached this
conclusion by analogizing § 6511(a) and § 6511(b)(2)(A) to the one- and

three-year statutory limitations provisions governing securities fraud actions.'" The significance of this analogy arose from the Supreme Court's
decision in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,'" a

post-Irwin case that rejected the application of equitable tolling in securities
fraud suits.'"
141. Id. On appeal, Oropallo asserted several alternative theories in addition to the
equitable tolling argument claiming that the statute of limitations should not bar his suit.
Id. First, Oropallo alleged that the dismissal of his suit violated his constitutional rights by
depriving him of his property without due process of law and of his right of access to the
courts to address grievances. Id. In addition, Oropallo asserted that applying the limitations
period to him violated his equal protection rights because the IRS can reach back further in
time to collect unpaid taxes than a taxpayer can to collect a refund. Id. Finally, Oropallo
claimed that the notice to him from the IRS constituted a waiver of the limitations period.
Id. The First Circuit rejected each of these claims. Id. at 31-32. First, the court found that
the due process claim lacked merit because postcollection review sufficiently satisfies due
process in tax cases. Id. at 31. Second, the court noted that the IRS notice to Oropallo
gave him the right to file suit within two years, but said nothing with respect to satisfying
the criteria governing the filing of a claim with the IRS. Id. at 31-32; see also supraPart
III (discussing statutory framework and noting need to exhaust administrative remedies
before filing suit). Finally, the court of appeals stated that the IRS and the taxpayers are
not similarly situated parties to whom equal protection of the law applies. Oropallo, 994
F.2d at 32.
142. Compare Oropallo, 994 F.2d at 26-32 (applying Irwin rule but finding that
presumption of equitable tolling was rebutted) with United States v. Vintilla, 931 F.2d 1444,
1446-47 (1 lth Cir. 1991) (dismissing Irwin rule in tax refund context).
143. Oropallo, 994 F.2d at 28-31.
144. Id. at 30.
145. 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
146. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363
(1991) (holding that statute of limitations governing private securities fraud suits cannot be
equitably tolled). In Lampf, the Supreme Court considered which statute of limitations
governed an implied private cause of action under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (1934 Act) and whether that limitations period could be equitably tolled. Id.
at 352. The plaintiffs in Lampf alleged that the defendants violated Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 by misrepresenting the tax benefits of partnerships in which the plaintiffs invested
between 1979 and 1981. Id. at 353. The plaintiffs received notice in 1982 and 1983 that
the IRS was investigating the partnerships, but the plaintiffs asserted that they did not
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In Lampf, the Supreme Court held that the statutory limitations structure governing implied private causes of action under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was incompatible with the doctrine of

equitable tolling. 47 The statutory provisions considered in Lampf provided
that a suit may be commenced up to one year following the discovery of
facts giving rise to a cause of action, but may not be initiated more than
three years after the occurrence of the events that gave rise to that cause of

action."t According to the Lampf Court, this one- and three-year statutory
discover the alleged misrepresentations until 1985. Id. at 352-53. The plaintiffs filed suit
in 1986 and 1987. Id. at 352. The district court dismissed the complaints on the grounds
that the plaintiffs did not file the suits in a timely manner. Id. at 353. In addition, the court
stated that the state's two-year limitations period on fraud claims governed the implied cause
of action. Id. Because the plaintiffs received inquiry notice in 1982, the court concluded
that the statute of limitations barred the action. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed
and remanded the cases, stating that factual disputes regarding when the plaintiffs received
notice precluded the district court from granting summary judgment. Id. at 354. The court
of appeals, however, agreed with the district court that the state statute of limitations should
govern the action. Id. The Supreme Court rejected the lower courts' conclusion that state
law governed and held that the federal statute of limitations applicable to express causes of
action under the 1934 Act also governed the implied causes of action at issue in Lampf. Id.
at 355. The Lampf Court acknowledged that when Congress fails to provide a specific
statute of limitations for a federal cause of action, courts generally should adopt the local
rule most analogous to that action. Id. However, the Court noted the existence of exceptions to this rule and considered several factors to determine whether a federal or state
limitations period should be adopted. Id. at 356-58. The Lampf Court concluded that when
the cause of action at issue was judicially created from a federal statute, courts should adopt
the statute of limitations governing express causes of action under the statute of origin. Id.
at 358-61. The Supreme Court also rejected an argument raised by the plaintiffs that the
limitations period contained in an amendment to the 1934 Act should govern the case;
rather, the Court found that the limitations structure originally enacted to govern actions
brought under the statute best reflected congressional intent. Id. at 361-62. The limitations
provisions adopted by the Court set up a one- and three-year structure limiting the period
in which an action may be commenced. Id. at 361. More specifically, the statute provided
that an action for fraud could be brought within one year from the time of discovery, but
no suit could be commenced more than three years after the occurrence of the events giving
rise to the cause of action, regardless of notice. Id. at 363. The Supreme Court concluded
that this one- and three-year structure was incompatible with the doctrine of equitable
tolling. Id. The Court explained this conclusion by noting that the one-year period begins
only after the discovery of the fraudulent actions and thereby makes equitable tolling
unnecessary. Id.. Moreover, the three-year limitation represents a statute of repose that
cannot be equitably tolled because its sole purpose is to place an outer limit on the time in
which a claim can be made. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the statute of
limitations governing implied causes of action under Section 10(b) barred the plaintiffs'
actions in this case. Id. at 364.
147. Id. at 363.
148. Id. Although the Lampf Court considered several provisions in the Securities Act
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limitations structure reflected the congressional intent to place an absolute
limit on the time in which a securities fraud claim could be commenced. 49
In Oropallo, the First Circuit analogized § 6511(a) to the one-year
limitation period discussed in Lampf.5 ° The court of appeals first asserted
that both statutes represented open-ended provisions that placed no real time
limits on when a suit can be brought."' In Lampf, the one-year limit
required an individual to file suit within one year after discovering the facts
needed to file suit.152 Because discovery of these facts might occur at any
time, the one-year period did not truly limit the time in which the individual
could assert a claim. 53 According to the First Circuit, § 6511(a) was
similarly open-ended. 54 Although the court noted a split in authority as to
whether a return filed after its due date was a "return" for the purposes of
§ 6511(a), the court assumed for purposes of the case that an untimely
return constituted a "return" under § 6511(a). 55 Under this interpretation,
a taxpayer could file a return at any time and still have three years to file
a claim for refund.' 56 Consequently, the three-year time limit of § 6511(a)
becomes "totally illusory" because it will not commence until a taxpayer
has filed a return.'
The First Circuit therefore concluded that both
§ 6511(a) and the one-year limit in Lampf constituted open-ended statutory
limitations provisions. 5 '
In addition, the First Circuit found that § 6511(a) resembled the oneyear limit in Lampf on more substantive grounds. 5 9 In Lampf, the Supreme
Court stated that the one-year period for filing suit rendered tolling unnecessary because the time limitation did not begin until after the taxpayer
of 1933 and the 1934 Act that set up a one- and three-year structure, the Court adopted as
the governing standard the language of Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act, which provides: "No
action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this section, unless brought
within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three
years after such violation." Id. at 360, 364 n.9 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1988)); see
also Oropallo, 994 F.2d at 30 (discussing Lampj).
149. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 363; see also Oropallo, 994 F.2d at 30 (discussing Lampt).
150. Oropallo, 994 F.2d at 30.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 27.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 30.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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actually discovered the fraud."tu The First Circuit interpreted this finding
to stand for the principle that, in a situation like Lampf, once an individual
knew the relevant facts, the one-year period provided sufficient time for
that person to file suit.' The First Circuit then concluded that because a
tax return contains all the information required to determine whether a
refund is due, the three-year limitation in § 6511(a) provides a taxpayer
with ample time to file suit." Thus, by equating the filing of a tax return
with the discovery of fraud, the court of appeals concluded that § 6511(a)
should not be subject to equitable tolling.163
The First Circuit also concluded that § 6511(b)(2)(A) represents an
absolute outer limit on the time in which a refund may be recovered.164
The court reached this conclusion by analogizing § 6511(b)(2)(A) to the
65 The court of appeals
three-year limitations period discussed in Lampf.1
stated that "[b]y imposing an 'outside limit' or 'cut-off' on the amount of
taxes which can be recovered, section 6511(b)(2)(A) operates like the threeyear portion of the limitations period in Lampf, and thus is a 'period of
repose inconsistent with tolling.'""1 The First Circuit therefore concluded
that § 6511(a) and § 6511(b)(2)(A) function together like the statutory
provisions governing securities fraud actions that the Lampf Court held to
be inconsistent with tolling. 67
C. The Sovereign Rights Approach
In the most recent case rejecting the doctrine of equitable tolling in a
tax refund suit, Webb v. United States, 16 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit asserted a different rationale for rejecting the
Irwin rule than either the First or Eleventh Circuits previously had
offered.' 69 Like those courts, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that statutes
160. Id.
161. Id.

162. Id.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 31 (citing Lampf, 501 U.S. at 363).

167. Id.
168. 66 F.3d 691 (4th Cir. 1995).
169. See Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691, 702 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that statute
of limitations jurisdictionally barred tax refund suit), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W.
3593 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1996) (No. 95-1360); see also supra text accompanying notes 5-22
(providing summary of essential facts in Webb).
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of limitations represent waivers of sovereign immunity and, as such, must be
construed strictly. 70 The court also noted the traditional reluctance of courts
to subject § 6511 to equitable tolling, but then acknowledged that Irwin
created a need to reconsider this traditional approach. 17 Unlike the First or
Eleventh Circuits, the Fourth Circuit focused on the Supreme Court's statement in Irwin that "the same rebuttable presumption of equitable toling
applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits
against the United States.""n The Fourth Circuit therefore concluded that the
"[eiqual treatment of private and government defendants was.., the basis
for the [Supreme] Court's formulation of its 'general rule."'
Thus, the
court of appeals noted that when the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to
an action brought against a private litigant, the doctrine also presumptively
applies to a similar action brought against the United States."7 However, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that tax refund suits differ substantially from tort
or employment cases because "tax refund cases cannot be brought against
private litigants, nor are they even comparable to suits that can be brought
against private litigants. " 175 According to the court, the power to tax represents a sovereign power, and tax refund suits in which the government seeks
to enforce its sovereign rights represent distinct cases from those in which
the government attempts to protect essentially private rights. 76 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the rule announced in Irwin does
not apply to tax refund suits because such actions cannot be brought against
private parties. 177
In addition, the Fourth Circuit stated that even if the rebuttable presumption announced in Irwin did apply to the present case, the statutory
limitations structure rebutted that presumption.I78 The court cited Oropallo
in support of this conclusion and essentially adopted the analysis of the First
79
Circuit in that case. 1

170. Webb, 66 F.3d at 695.
171. Id. at 693-97.
172. Id. at 696-97 (quoting Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 9596 (1990)).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 697.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 698.
178. Id. at 699.

179. Id. at 699-700; see also supra Part V.B (discussing First Circuit's analysis in
Oropallo).
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D. A Split in the Circuits
As the decisions of the Eleventh, First, and Fourth Circuits demonstrate,
federal courts remain reluctant to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling in
tax refund suits."tu Moreover, this reluctance exists despite the Supreme
Court's decision in Irwin instructing courts to presume that equitable tolling
principles apply in suits against the United States."' Nonetheless, several
courts have departed from this traditional approach and have applied the
doctrine of equitable tolling in tax refund suits. 12
Most notably, in Brockamp v. United States,"' the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit created a split among the circuits by holding
that a taxpayer's mental incapacity, if proved, could equitably toll the statute
of limitations in a tax refund suit."8 Stanley B. McGill was a ninety-threeyear-old man who was not in possession of his full mental faculties."S In
1984, McGill sent the IRS a check for $7000 along with an application for
an automatic extension of time to file his 1983 income tax return. 86 However, McGill never filed his 1983 return, and in 1986 the IRS transferred the
$7000 from McGill's account to an "Excess Collection Account." 11 McGill
died in 1988. 1 The sole beneficiary and administrator of McGill's estate
was his daughter Marian Brockamp. 8 9 During the administration of the
estate, Brockamp discovered that her father had overpaid his 1983 taxes and
sent a letter informing the IRS that her father mistakenly had written a check
for $7000 when he should have sent only $700. 190 In 1991, Brockamp filed
180. See supra Part V.A-C (discussing decisions of Eleventh, First, and Fourth Circuits
rejecting equitable tolling).
181. See supra Part IV.B (discussing Irwin decision).
182. See, e.g., Brockamp v. United States, 67 F.3d 260, 263 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
that statute of limitations in tax refund suit may be equitably tolled), cert. granted, 116 S.
Ct. 1875 (1996); Scott v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 1499, 1507-08 (D. Haw. 1993)
(same), aft'd, 70 F.3d 120 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub nom. United States v.
Brockamp, 116 S. Ct. 1875 (1996); Wiltgen v. United States, 813 F. Supp. 1387, 1394-95
(N.D. Iowa 1992) (same); Johnsen v. United States, 758 F. Supp. 834, 836 (E.D.N.Y.

1991) (same).
183. 67 F.3d 260 (9th Cir. 1995).
184. See Brockamp, 67 F.3d at 261-63 (holding that taxpayer's mental incompetence
equitably tolled statute of limitations in tax refund suit).

185. Id. at 261.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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a tax return for McGill's 1983 tax liability. 191 The IRS assessed $427 in
taxes and declined to refund any of the excess amount McGill had paid. "
In response, Brockamp filed suit against the government to recover the taxes
that her father had paid erroneously."9 The district court concluded that the
statute of limitations jurisdictionally barred the action and therefore dismissed
the case.'94
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit considered the statutory provisions governing tax refund suits and acknowledged that those provisions would jurisdictionally bar Brockamp's action absent equitable tolling."9 The court then
evaluated the impact of Irwin on Dalm and concluded that the rule the
Supreme Court announced in Irwin severely limited Dalm.196 The Ninth
Circuit therefore considered § 6511 in light of the Irwin rule."9 The court
of appeals stated that neither the statute's specific language nor its legislative
history expressly prohibited the application of equitable principles.' 98 In
addition, the court noted that since the Supreme Court decided Irwin Congress had taken no action to indicate that the doctrine of equitable tolling
should not apply to § 6511. '1 Finally, the court dismissed the Oropallo
argument analogizing § 6511 with the securities statutes considered in
Lampf.2w Having determined that § 6511 could be equitably tolled, the court
of appeals then concluded that mental incapacity represented a legitimate
ground for tolling the statute of limitations."0° Consequently, the Ninth
Circuit remanded the case to determine the extent of McGill's mental incapacity when he overpaid his taxes in 1983. 1
V7. Resolving the Debate
A. Reconciling Dalm and Irwin
To resolve the debate over the role of equitable tolling in tax refund
suits, one must first determine the relationship between the Supreme Court's
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 262.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at262n.1.
Id. at 263.
Id.
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decision in Irwin and its prior decision in Dalm. This determination requires
choosing one of three alternatives: First, the Irwin Court did not intend to
alter the Daim Court's approach advocating the strict enforcement of the
statute of limitations in tax refund suits.'
Second, and in direct contrast to
the first alternative, the Irwin Court essentially invalidated the Court's approach in Dalm and other prior inconsistent cases.2'4 Third, Irwin and Dalm
may be reconciled because each deals with a distinct judicial doctrine arising
from different policy considerations. ' An analysis of these three alternatives reveals that the third approach - focusing on the distinct doctrinal
considerations of each case - represents the most logical and appropriate
2 °6
explanation for the conflicting language within Irwin and Dalm.
1. The Argument Favoring Daln
The first alternative posits that the Dalm decision, rather than the Irwin
decision, controls the issue of equitable tolling in tax refund suits.'
Advocates of this approach assert that one can factually distinguish the two
cases because Irwin involved a Title VII employment discrimination claim
while Dalm involved a tax refund suit. 0 8 Thus, although Irwin may have
announced a general presumption of equitable tolling in suits against the
government, Dalm precludes the application of that doctrine in the tax refund
context. 9 At least one court has suggested that the Supreme Court's failure
to address the conflicting language in Dalm and Irwin reinforces this argument.2 1 In addition, for Irwin to invalidate Dalm, several Justices on the
203. See infra Part VI.A.1 (discussing position that Dalm controls issue of equitable
tolling).
204. See infra Part VI.A.2 (discussing position that Irwin controls issue of equitable
tolling).
205. See infra Part VI.A.3 (asserting that Dalm and Irwin may be reconciled).
206. See infra Part VI.A.3 (same).
207. See Vintilla v. United States, 931 F.2d 1444, 1446 (1lth Cir. 1991) (finding that
Irwin did not alter Daim Court's approach to statute of limitations in tax refund suits);
Brockamp v. United States, 859 F. Supp. 1283, 1288-89 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (applying
Oropallo and Dalmn decisions to reject doctrine of equitable tolling), rev'd, 67 F.3d 260, 263
(9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1875 (1996); Webb v. United States, 850 F.
Supp. 489, 492 (E.D. Va. 1994) (finding Dalm more instructive than Irwin), aff'd on other
grounds, 66 F.3d 691,702 (4th Cir. 1995), petitionfor cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S.
Feb. 23, 1996) (No. 95-1360).
208. See Webb, 850 F. Supp. at 492-93 (distinguishing Dalm and Irwin).
209. Id.
210. See Vintilla, 931 F.2d at 1447 n.1 (finding that Irwin did not alter holding in
Dam); see also supra notes 113-27 and accompanying text (discussing Vintilla).
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Supreme Court would have had to change their position on the issue over
a span of just nine months. 2"

Critics of this first approach note that this alternative does not account
for several key elements of the Irwin decision.2"2 First, the Supreme Court
did not limit its holding in Irwin simply to the context of Title VII suits, but
instead employed broad language to announce a new general rule." 3 As
Lampf demonstrates, the Supreme Court has recognized that courts should
apply the Irwin rule in contexts other than Title VII disputes.2 4 Second,
the Irwin Court's failure to discuss Dalm indicates nothing about whether
Dalm survived the Irwin decision. 215 The Irwin Court acknowledged that
a general inconsistency existed among prior decisions; nonetheless, the

Court specifically discussed only a few of the cases that Irwin essentially

invalidated. 216 These criticisms suggest that another approach may better

account for the discrepancies between Irwin and Dalm.
2. The Argument FavoringIrwin
The second alternative asserts that Irwin invalidated Dalm's strict

adherence to the statute of limitations in tax refund suits. 217 This approach

finds support in the criticisms stated above, particularly with respect to the

broad language employed by the Irwin Court in announcing a new general
rule.21 8

Support for this alternative also arises from the Irwin Court's

211. Compare Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 90 (1990) (Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy constituted majority), with United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 598 (1990) (Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy constituted majority).
212. See Ronald A. Stein, Will Equitable Tolling of the Statute of Limitations Gain
Wider Acceptance in Tax Cases?, 81 J. TAX'N 370, 373 (1994) (criticizing courts that
refused to apply Irwin rule in tax refund suits).
213. See Scott v. United States, 795 F. Supp. 1028, 1034-35 (D. Haw. 1992) (criticizing Vintilla decision).
214. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363
(1991) (evaluating statute governing securities fraud actions in light of Irwin rule). Although
the Supreme Court concluded that the statute in Lampf could not be equitably tolled, the
Court reached this decision only by determining that the presumption of Irwin had been
rebutted by the statutory structure. Id.
215. See Stein, supra note 212, at 373 (noting that Irwin discussed few prior cases).
216. Id.
217. See Johnsen v. United States, 758 F. Supp. 834, 836 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (applying
Irwin rule and concluding that statute of limitations was equitably tolled).
218. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990) (announcing
new general rule); see also supra Part IV.B (discussing Irwin).
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discussion of Soriano v. United States," 9 in which the Supreme Court
refused to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling in an action against the
government.' 2 The Irwin Court compared the statutory provisions at issue
in Irwin and Soriano and concluded that the two statutes did not differ
significantly enough to suggest a different congressional intent with respect
to equitable tolling."2 Nonetheless, the Irwin Court held that a general
2
presumption of equitable tolling applies to suits against the government.
In so holding, the Irwin Court essentially overruled Soriano without explicitly doing so.m Thus, although the Irwin Court failed to address the Dalm
decision specifically, the Court may well have implicitly overruled Dalm
and similar cases, as well as Soriano. 24
This second alternative nonetheless fails to address several troubling
points raised by the first alternative. In particular, this approach does not
account for the fact that, for Irwin to invalidate Dalm, several of the
Justices who joined the majority decisions in both cases must have changed
their position on this issue within just nine months.' Second, given the
close proximity in time of these two decisions, one would expect the Irwin
Court to have addressed the Dalm decision despite its reliance on broad
language to announce a new general rule. Consequently, like the first
alternative, the second approach fails to address fully the seemingly conflicting positions advanced by the Supreme Court in Irwin and Dalm.
3. The Argument for Reconciliation
The third analytical approach asserts that Irwin and Dalm can be
reconciled because the two cases involve theoretically distinct doctrines that
arise from different policy considerations.' In Dalm, the Supreme Court
held that a taxpayer cannot invoke the doctrine of equitable recoupment to
219. 352 U.S. 270 (1957).
220. See Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 275-77 (1957) (refusing to toll statute
of limitations governing claim for just compensation).
221. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 98 (White, J., concurring) (stating that majority's opinion directly overrules
Soriano).
224. Id.
225. See supra note 211 (discussing which Justices constituted majority in Dam and in
Irwin).
226. See Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691, 698 (9th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing Dam
and Irwin), petitionfor cert.filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1996) (No. 95-1360);
Scott v. United States, 795 F. Supp. 1028, 1032 (D. Haw. 1992) (same).

1600

53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1571 (1996)

provide the courts with jurisdiction over a tax refund suit when the statute

of limitations bars such a claim.' In contrast, the Irwin Court held that
a rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applies to suits against the government."
The Dalm decision is both analytically sound and practically reasonable
when viewed in light of the policy considerations underlying the doctrine
of equitable recoupment. 29 As the Dalm Court noted: "The essence of the
doctrine of recoupment is . . . [that] recoupment is in the nature of a
defense arising out of some feature of the transaction upon which the
plaintiff's action is grounded."" 0 Equitable recoupment does not look to

see whether some disability or nefarious government action prevented a
taxpayer from asserting a claim for refund prior to the expiration of the
statute of limitations; instead, the doctrine recognizes that any problems
concerning finality or fairness essentially have been eliminated because the

court already must adjudicate the matter. 31 As a result, even if a claimant
acted negligently in failing to assert a timely claim for refund, such negli-

gence does not undermine the justification for a court to consider the

recoupment claim. However, in a situation like Dalm, in which the taxpayer asserted a claim for recoupment not as a defense but as an affirmative
basis for an independent action, the equitable considerations that justify
recoupment disappear. z 2
227. See United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 598 (1990) (holding that court cannot
exercise independent jurisdiction over otherwise time-barred claim based on equitable
recoupment); see also supra Part IV.A (discussing Dalm).
228. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990) (holding that
rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applies in suits against government); see also
supra Part IV.B (discussing Irwin).
229. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (discussing rationales underlying
equitable recoupment).
230. Dalm, 494 U.S. at 611 (citing Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329
U.S. 296, 299 (1946) (quoting Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 262 (1935))). The
Dalm Court continued: "[Equitable recoupment] has never been thought to allow one
transaction to be offset against another, but only to permit a transaction which is made the
subject of suit by plaintiff to be examined in all its aspects, and judgment to be rendered that
does justice in view of the one transaction as a whole." Id. (citations omitted).
231. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (discussing rationales underlying
equitable recoupment).
232. But see Dalm, 494 U.S. at 614-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding that
doctrine of equitable recoupment should apply). Justice Stevens noted that the equitable
considerations in Dalm were arguably significant because the taxpayer had not raised the
claim for recoupment in the Tax Court because she believed that court lacked jurisdiction
over such claims. Id. The majority's holding in Dalm therefore effectively barred the taxpayer from having her recoupment claim adjudicated. Id. Nonetheless, the majority did
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In contrast to Dalm, Irwin focused on the doctrine of equitable tolling
in suits against the government. 3 The primary purpose of equitable tolling
is to permit an individual to assert an affirmative claim despite the expira-

tion of the statute of limitations when that individual was unable to assert
a timely claim through no fault of his own.' Equitable tolling thus focuses
more on whether the plaintiff demonstrates an especially sympathetic factual
situation and less on whether concerns of finality or fairness have been

diminished."35 Because DaIm involved the latter and not the former, the
Irwin Court had no reason to discuss or even to consider Dalm.2 6 This

distinction explains why several Justices could join the majority opinion in
both Irwin and Dalm without having changed their positions on the respective issues.

7

not discuss this inequity, but instead dismissed the issue in a footnote, stating: "We have no
occasion to pass upon the question whether Dalm could have raised a recoupment claim in
the Tax Court." Id. at 611 n.8. Justice Stevens sharply criticized the majority's dismissal
of this fact: "The Court reserves in a footnote an issue that would render obsolete its
holding." Id. at 612. Stevens later added:
Of course, if this Court were eventually to decide the reserved issue by holding
that the Tax Court has jurisdiction to hear an equitable recoupment claim, today's
decision would become a complete dead letter. No taxpayer would have any
reason to litigate the deficiency and the recoupment issues separately, and in any
event a judgment upon the former would bar a subsequent suit upon the latter
under the doctrine of res judicata.
Id. at 615 n.3. Although the Supreme Court has not taken up that issue, the Tax Court
decided it has jurisdiction to hear a claim for recoupment. See Estate of Mueller v.
Commissioner, 101 T.C. 551, 557 (1993) (holding that Tax Court has jurisdiction over
recoupment claims); see also supra note 81 (discussing Mueller).
233. See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 93-96 (holding that rebuttable presumption of equitable
tolling applies to suits against United States); see also supraPart IV.B (discussing Irwin).
234. See Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451-53 (7th Cir. 1990)
(discussing doctrine of equitable tolling); see also supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text
(discussing rationales underlying equitable tolling).
235. See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (discussing
policies underlying equitable tolling). In Burnett, the Supreme Court noted that "[tihis
policy of repose, designed to protect defendants, is frequently outweighed, however, where
the interests of justice require vindication of the plaintiff's rights." Id.; see also supra notes
56-64 and accompanying text (discussing policies underlying equitable tolling).
236. See Stein, supra note 212, at 373 (criticizing several courts that relied on Dalm).
Stein noted that "while [Dalm] involved a tardy refund claim, the Supreme Court neither
directly nor indirectly ruled on the notion of equitable tolling.... This probably explains
why the Irwin briefs and decision never cite Dalm - courts and litigants have little reason
to invoke an irrelevant decision." Id. (citation omitted).
237. See supra note 211 (discussing composition of majority in both Dalm and Irwin).
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B. Applications of the Irwin Rule

Assuming Irwin and Dalm can be reconciled based upon their consideration of two distinct judicial doctrines, one must then consider how courts
should apply the Irwin rule in the context of tax refund suits. Current law
provides three alternatives. 8 The first approach, advocated by the First

Circuit in Oropallo, posits that the Irwin presumption of equitable tolling
is rebutted by analogizing § 6511 to the securities fraud provisions that the
Lampf Court found to be incompatible with equitable tolling. 9 The second

alternative, articulated by the Fourth Circuit in Webb, asserts that although
the Irwin rule generally controls in actions against the government, suits
involving sovereign powers are not subject to equitable tolling.'

The third

approach, asserted by the Ninth Circuit in Brockamp, permits courts to
invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling in tax refund suits.24

As the

following analysis will reveal, this third alternative represents the best
resolution of how to apply the Irwin rule, although certain constraints
should limit the use of equitable tolling in the context of tax refund suits.24

1. The Securities FraudAnalogy
In Oropallo, the First Circuit rejected the doctrine of equitable tolling
in tax refund suits by analogizing § 6511 with the statutory limitations
period governing securities fraud suits.243

The First Circuit's analysis

acknowledged that Irwin controlled the equitable tolling issue, but the court
238. See Brockamp v. United States, 67 F.3d 260, 263 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that
statute of limitations in tax refund suit may be equitably tolled), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct.
1875 (1996); Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691, 702 (4th Cir. 1995) (concluding that
equitable tolling cannot be applied in suits involving sovereign rights), petitionfor cert.
filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1996) (No. 95-1360); Oropallo v. United States,
994 F.2d 25, 29-31 (lst Cir. 1993) (rejecting equitable tolling by analogizing § 6511 with
one- and three-year limitations provision discussed in Lampj); Scott v. United States, 847
F. Supp. 1499, 1507-08 (D. Haw. 1993) (same), aft'd, 70 F.3d 120 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
granted sub nom. United States v. Brockamp, 116 S. Ct. 1875 (1996).
239. See Oropallo, 994 F.2d at 29-31 (analogizing § 6511 with one- and three-year
limitations provision discussed in Lamp]).
240. See Webb, 66 F.3d at 702 (concluding that equitable tolling cannot be applied in
suits involving sovereign rights).
241. See, e.g., Brockamp, 67 F.3d at 263 (holding that statute of limitations in tax
refund suit may be equitably tolled); Scott, 847 F. Supp. at 1507-08 (same).
242. See infra Part VI.B.3 (discussing when courts should and should not apply doctrine
of equitable tolling in tax refund suits).
243. See Oropallo, 994 F.2d at 29-31 (analogizing statute considered in Lampf with
§ 6511); see also supra Part V.B (discussing First Circuit's analysis in Oropallo).
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believed that Lampf altered the analysis again.2' The court thus analogized
§ 6511(a) and § 6511(b)(2)(A) to the one- and three-year limitations period
that the Lampf Court found to be incompatible with equitable tolling.245 In
making this analogy, the First Circuit concluded that both § 6511(a) and the
one-year limit in Lampf constituted open-ended limitations provisions. 2'
In addition, the court found that a tax return provides an individual with all
the information needed to determine if a refund is due in the same way that
discovery of fraud provides an individual with the information required to
file suit.247 The court thus concluded that § 6511(a) provides a taxpayer
with sufficient time to file a claim for refund with the IRS and is therefore
not subject to equitable tolling.2" The First Circuit also found that
§ 6511(b)(2)(A) resembled the three-year limitation in Lampf and thus
represented a statute of repose inconsistent with the doctrine of equitable
tolling.249 Despite this elaborate analysis, an examination of the First
Circuit's decision in Oropallo demonstrates that the court's analogy cannot
serve as0 a general approach to the doctrine of equitable tolling in tax refund
5
suits.2
First, not all courts share the First Circuit's belief that § 6511(a)
represents an open-ended provision."~ In Brockamp, the Ninth Circuit
noted that it previously had held that individuals who fail to file a tax return
in a timely manner cannot invoke the provisions of § 6511(a) to recover a
refund. 2 Under this interpretation, the time limit in § 6511(a) is not
244.

Oropallo v. United States, 994 F.2d 25, 29 (lst Cir. 1993).

245. Id. at 30-31.
246. Id. at 30.
247. Id.
248.

Id.

249. Id. at31.
250.

See, e.g., Brockamp v. United States, 67 F.3d 260, 261-63 (9th Cir. 1995)

(rejecting First Circuit's analysis in Oropallo), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1875 (1996); First
Interstate Bank of Nevada v. United States, 874 F. Supp. 286, 288-90 (D. Nev. 1994)

(same); Scott v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 1499, 1505 (D. Haw. 1993) (same), af'd, 70
F.3d 120 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. grantedsub nom. United States v. Brockamp, 116 S. Ct.

1875 (1996).
251. See Brockamp, 67 F.3d at 262 n.1 (dismissing Oropallo).
252. Id. The Ninth Circuit had previously stated:
A two-year period for filing a claim is mandated by section 6511(a) in this case.
To hold that the filing of a return more than two years after payment of taxes
invokes the three-year period of § 6511(a) would reward strategic behavior on
the part of the taxpayers and create a discrepancy in limitations periods that was
not intended by the Internal Revenue Code.
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"totally illusory," and the Ninth Circuit therefore rejected the analogy
between § 6511(a) and the one-year limit in Lampf 3
In addition, the First Circuit's attempt to analogize § 6511(a) to the
one-year period in Lampf suffers when applied to a factual scenario different than Oropallo. 4 A tax return does not always contain the information
required to determine whether an overpayment has been made; in fact,
taxpayers often must evaluate other sources of information to make such a
determination. 55 More significantly, a mentally incompetent taxpayer will
often lack the ability to assess accurately a tax return or any other information to determine if a refund is due.5 6 Finally, as Webb demonstrates, in
extreme cases a taxpayer may be prevented from evaluating her own tax
return.5 7 The Fourth Circuit specifically noted in Webb that "[t]he facts of
the case at hand belie this observation [of the First Circuit with respect to
§ 6511(a)]."8 Consequently, the First Circuit's comparison between the
one-year limitation period in Lampf and § 6511(a) does not accurately
reflect the function and role of § 6511(a) in tax refund suits.
The First Circuit's attempt to analogize § 6511(b)(2)(A) to the threeyear limitations period discussed in Lampf is equally unpersuasive. In
particular, the language of the two provisions discussed in Oropallo differs
substantively"9 The securities fraud provision states that no "action shall
be maintained to enforce any liability created under this section, unless
brought . . . within three years after such violation. "'

In contrast,

§ 6511(b)(2)(A) provides that "the credit or refund shall not exceed the
Id. (citing Miller v. United States, 38 F.3d 473, 475-76 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that
taxpayer who files return more than two years after it was due cannot take advantage of

three-year period to file claim for refund)).
253. Id.; see also supra Part V.B (discussing Oropallo'sinterpretation of § 6511(a)).
254. See Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691, 700 n.5 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that
factual circumstances in Webb would not support First Circuit's analysis in Oropallo),
petitionfor cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1996) (No. 95-1360); Scott v.

United States, 847 F. Supp. 1499, 1505 (D. Haw. 1993) (criticizing First Circuit's opinion
in Oropallo), aft'd, 70 F.3d 120 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. grantedsub nom. United States v.
Brockamp, 116 S. Ct. 1875 (1996).
255. Scott, 847 F. Supp. at 1506.
256. Id.
257. Webb, 66 F.3d at 700 n.5.
258. Id.
259. See Scott, 847 F. Supp. at 1505 (criticizing Oropallo).
260. 15 U.S.C. § 78(i)(e) (1994); see also Scott v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 1499,
1505 (D. Haw. 1993) (discussing statutory provision considered in Lampj), aft'd, 70 F.3d

120 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. grantedsub nom. United States v. Brockamp, 116 S. Ct. 1875
(1996).
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portion of the tax paid within the [3-year] period [prescribed in subsection
"6 Thus, § 6511(b)(2)(A) does not serve as a total bar to any
(a)] ....
action, but2 only limits the amount of credit or refund that a taxpayer may
recover.

26

Moreover, the legislative history of the earliest predecessor of
§ 6511(b)(2)(A) reveals that Congress did not intend for such a provision

to serve as a statute of repose.5 3 Rather, Congress enacted the provision
simply to prevent a taxpayer from reviving an otherwise barred claim by
paying a minimal portion of the tax due prior to filing a refund claim for
the entire amount of the tax.5'

The legislative history contains no discus-

sion of equitable tolling nor any indication that Congress intended the
provision not to be subject to equitable tolling.'
Beyond these textual considerations, the First Circuit's analogy fails
because the overall structure of the one- and three-year limitations provision

in Lampf does not accurately reflect the structure of § 6511. In Lampf, the
Supreme Court stated that "[b]ecause the purpose of the 3-year limitation
is clearly to serve as a cutoff, we hold that tolling principles do not apply
to that period."I Thus, the Supreme Court's conclusion that the three-year
period in Lampf could not be equitably tolled rested heavily on the notion
that the three-year provision served to cut off the open-ended one-year

limitations period. 7 However, in courts sharing the Ninth Circuit's belief
that § 6511(a) does not resemble the open-ended one-year period in Lampf,
261. 26 U.S.C. § 6511(b)(2)(A) (1994); see also Scott, 847 F. Supp. at 1505 (comparing text of statutes). In comparing the statutes, the Scott court mistakenly quoted the text
of § 6511(b)(2)(B) rather than the text of § 6511(b)(2)(A). Id. Nevertheless, because the
key language in each provision is nearly identical, this minor mistake does not undermine
the court's analysis.
262. Id.
263. See S. REP. No. 68-398, at 33 (1924); see also Stein, supra note 212, at 373
(discussing legislative history of predecessor of § 6511(b)(2)(A)).
264. See S. REP. No. 68-398, at 33. The Senate report states:
In order that a late payment of a small portion of the tax due may not extend the
time for filing a claim for refund of the entire tax, a limitation has been inserted
by the committee restricting the amount of a credit or refund to the portion of the
tax paid during the four years immediately preceding the filing of the claim.
Id.; see also Stein, supra note 212, at 373 (discussing legislative history of predecessor of
§ 6511(b)(2)(A)).
265. See Stein, supra note 212, at 373 (discussing legislative history of predecessor of
§ 6511(b)(2)(A)).
266. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363
(1991).
267. Id.
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§ 6511(b)(2)(A) has nothing to cut off.268

As a result, analogizing
§ 6511(b)(2)(A) to the three-year period in Lampf does not accurately
reflect the role of that provision in tax refund suits.

Finally, the Lampf decision on which Oropallo relied generated substantial controversy in and of itself.69 Several commentators have criticized
the Lampf Court's rationale for rejecting the doctrine of equitable tolling in
securities fraud actions.27 Moreover, in response to Lampf, Congress
immediately drafted legislation that would have extended the limitations

period, permitted equitable tolling, and prohibited the retroactive application of the Lampf decision.2 " Although most aspects of this legislation
were defeated as a result of substantial opposition from accounting firms
and the securities industry,2' this controversy raises doubts as to whether
the Supreme Court accurately evaluated congressional intent in the Lampf
case and whether the Court should rely upon that controversial decision in

evaluating the role of equitable tolling in tax refund suits.
2. Should Sovereign Rights Matter?
In Webb, the Fourth Circuit held that Irwin's rebuttable presumption
did not apply to tax refund suits because such actions directly involve the
sovereign powers of the government.273

The court of appeals strictly

268. See Brockamp v. United States, 67 F.3d 260, 262 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995) (criticizing
First Circuit's analysis in Oropallo), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1875 (1996).
269. See Christopher R. Leslie, Comment, Den of Inequity: The Casefor Equitable
Doctrines in Rule 10b-5 Cases, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1587, 1608-09 (1993) (discussing aftermath
of Lampf decision). Leslie noted:
Lampf was controversial for three reasons. First, on average, it shortened the
statute of limitations from that which had been applied using analogous state
statutes of limitations. Second, the decision eliminated equitable tolling for
securities fraud claims. Third, the decision was applied retroactively, causing
dismissal of the case before the Court as well as all other pending Rule 10b-5
cases which did not meet the new Lampf statute of limitations.
Id. at 1608.
270. See generally Lyman Johnson, Securities Fraud and the Mirage of Repose, 1992
Wis. L. REV. 607 (asserting that Supreme Court failed to distinguish normative grounds
underlying tolling principles and thus erred in completely rejecting equitable principles in
securities fraud cases); Leslie, supra note 269 (arguing for application of equitable tolling
principles in Rule lob-5 cases).
271. Leslie, supra note 269, at 1608-09.
272. Id. at 1609.
273. See Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691, 695-98 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that
statute of limitations in tax refund suit was not equitably tolled), petitionfor cert. filed, 64
U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1996) (No. 95-1360); see also supra Part V.C (discussing
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interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Irwin and thus distinguished tax
refund suits from other actions that can be brought against either the
government or private litigants. 4 However, the Fourth Circuit's justification for this narrow reading of Irwin does not properly address the legal
reasoning and policy considerations of the Irwin decision.
First, the Fourth Circuit's literal interpretation of the Irwin rule does
not comport with the overall language of the Supreme Court's opinion in
that case. The Irwin Court stated: "We think that this case affords us an
opportunity to adopt a more general rule to govern the applicability of
equitable tolling in suits against the Government."275 The Irwin Court's
implicit overruling of Soriano further indicates the broad nature of the Irwin
decision.276 Soriano involved a claim to recover just compensation for
property requisitioned by the United States Armed Forces during the
Japanese occupation of the Philippine Islands, a claim not unlike the typical
tax refund suit.' When the Soriano Court held that the claimant could not
invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling against the Government in that case,
the Court recognized that if it had applied the doctrine, "statutes permitting
suits for tax refids, tort actions,... and other claims against the Govern-

ment would all be affected. "'
Consequently, when the Irwin Court
implicitly overruled Soriano,279 the Court sanctioned the application of
Irwin's rebuttable presumption to all suits against the government. By
improperly narrowing the scope of the Irwin rule, the Fourth Circuit
essentially contradicted the language and reasoning of that case.
In addition to this interpretative criticism, the Fourth Circuit's emphasis in Webb on sovereign rights does not properly address the policy considerations implicated by equitable tolling. As stated above, the court of
appeals focused on the sovereign nature of the power to tax and distinguished tax refund suits from other actions such as tort and employment
disputes that can be brought against private parties, as well as against the
government.'m In support of this distinction, the court cited an opinion by
Webb).
274. Webb, 66 F.3d at 695-98.
275. Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990).
276. See id. at 94-95; Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 275 (1957) (rejecting
assertion that statute of limitations governing claim for just compensation could be equitably
tolled); see also supra notes 219-24 and accompanying text (discussing Soriano).
277. Soriano, 352 U.S. at 275.
278. Id. (emphasis added).
279. See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 98 (White, J., concurring) (stating that majority's opinion
directly overrules Soriano).
280. See Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691, 695-98 (4th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing
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Chief Judge Posner discussing the doctrine of laches and suggesting that

drawing a line along such grounds may be justified." However, in that
opinion, Posner also noted that "the questions when the government may
be stopped from suing and when it may be stopped from pleading a defense
of statute of limitations in a suit against it may not demand identical answers."'
Policy considerations demonstrate the validity of this latter
observation. Invoking equitable doctrines to preclude the government from
enforcing its sovereign rights could present a serious threat to the sover-

eign's ability to govern.3

In contrast, allowing equitable considerations

to permit the assertion of a claim against the government poses no such

threat when that claim simply alleges that the government has been unjustly
enriched. Thus, these policy considerations undermine the sovereign rights
distinction advocated by the Fourth Circuit in Webb.
3. A Narrow Doctrine of Equitable Tolling
Having dismissed the securities analogy and the sovereign rights

approach, no cogent argument remains to suggest that the doctrine of
equitable tolling should not be applied in tax refund cases.'

However,

having concluded that courts should not be barred from invoking the
doctrine per se, one must still consider the circumstances in which courts
should allow a taxpayer to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling. Al-

though by its nature equitable tolling demands that courts resolve this
question on a case-by-case basis, and a thorough discussion of this issue is
beyond the scope of this Note, the relevant case law and statutory provitax refund suits from other types of actions), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3593
(U.S. Feb. 23, 1996) (No. 95-1360); see also supra Part V.C (discussing Webb).
281. Webb, 66 F.3d at 697. The Fourth Circuit stated:
Chief Judge Posner, in a recent case addressing the applicability of the doctrine
of laches against the government, suggested the possibility of "draw[ing] a line
between government suits in which the government is seeking to enforce either
on its own behalf or that of private parties what are in the nature of private
rights, and government suits to enforce sovereign rights," and allowing equitable
relief only in the former class of cases. . . . The language in Irwin certainly
supports this distinction.
Id. at 697 n.2 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Administrative Enters., Inc., 46
F.3d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1995)).
282. See Administrative Enters., 46 F.3d at 673 (discussing whether doctrine of laches
can be invoked against government).
283. Id.
284. See supra Part VI.B.1 (dismissing securities analogy); supra Part VI.B.2 (criticizing sovereign rights approach).
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sions provide some indication as to when courts should and should not

permit a claimant to invoke the doctrine.'
In its broadest sense, the doctrine of equitable tolling simply means

that, through no fault of either party, a claimant lacked sufficient knowledge to assert his rights within the limitations period.'
Implicit in this
definition is the requirement that a claimant wishing to invoke the doctrine

must have exercised due diligence and not have been negligent in the
assertion of his claim.' Thus, a taxpayer's failure to exercise due diligence will outweigh any equitable considerations in the taxpayer's favor.211
However, in the context of tax refund suits, a claimant might not be permitted to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling even in some cases in which
these minimum criteria have been satisfied.
In particular, an analysis of the provisions within 26 U.S.C. § 6511(d)

reveals several situations in which a taxpayer cannot invoke the doctrine of
equitable tolling in tax refund suits.9 These provisions, enacted prior to
Irwin and thus under the presumption that § 6511(a) and § 6511(b)(2) can-

not be equitably tolled, extend the limitations period for taxpayers in certain
cases.' For example, in § 6511(d)(1), Congress created a special statute
of limitations of seven years for bad debts deductions.291 Section 6511(d)(1)
285. See Stein, supra note 212, at 374 (discussing when courts should apply equitable
tolling in tax refund cases).
286. See Tregenza v. Great Am. Communications Co., 12 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir.
1993) (discussing doctrine of equitable tolling).
287. See Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 453 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussing equitable tolling). In Cada, then Judge Posner stated: "When we are speaking not of
equitable estoppel but of equitable tolling, we are (to repeat) dealing with two innocent
parties and in these circumstances the negligence of the party invoking the doctrine can tip
the balance against its application - as it did, for example, in the Irwin case cited earlier."
Id.
288. See Stein, supra note 212, at 374 (discussing requirement that taxpayer exercise
due diligence).
289. See 26 U.S.C. § 6511(d) (1994) (providing exceptions to general statute of limitations in § 6511(a)).
290. See id. § 6511(d)(1) (providing special statute of limitations for bad debts and
worthless securities deductions).
291. See id. (providing special statute of limitations for bad debt deductions). Section
6511(d)(1) provides:
Seven-year period of limitation with respect to bad debts and worthless securities
If the claim for credit or refund relates to an overpayment of tax imposed by
subtitle A on account of(A) The deductibility by the taxpayer, under section 166 or section 832(c), of a
debt as a debt which became worthless, or, under section 165(g), of a loss from
worthlessness of a security, or
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applies to cases in which a taxpayer's right to a refund results from the
discovery of evidence several years after the taxes originally were paid.2'
Under traditional principles of equitable tolling, such circumstances should
permit a taxpayer to toll the statute of limitations.2' Nonetheless, applying
the doctrine of equitable tolling to cases involving bad debts would render
§ 6511(d)(1) meaningless. Consequently, in order to give effect to the

special exceptions detailed in § 6511(d), courts should not permit taxpayers
to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling in such cases.
(B) The effect that the deductibility of a debt or loss described in subparagraph
(A) has on the application to the taxpayer of a carryover, in lieu of the 3-year
period of limitation prescribed in subsection (a), the period shall be 7 years from
the date prescribed by law for filing the return for the year with respect to which
the claim is made. If the claim for credit or refund relates to an overpayment
on account of the effect that the deductibility of such a debt or loss has on the
application to the taxpayer of a carryback, the period shall be either 7 years from
the date prescribed by law for filing the return for the year of the net operating
loss which results in such carryback or the period prescribed in paragraph (2) of
this subsection, whichever expires the later. In the case of a claim described in
this paragraph the amount of the credit or refund may exceed the portion of the
tax paid within the period prescribed in subsection (b)(2) or (c), whichever is
applicable, to the extent of the amount of the overpayment attributable to the
deductibility of items described in this paragraph.
Id. Significantly, in § 6511(d)(1), Congress extended the limitations of both § 6511(a) and
§ 6511(b)(2) in order to provide relief to taxpayers.
292. See H.R. REP. No. 77-2333, at 44-45 (1942) (discussing reasons for enacting
special statute of limitations for bad debts deductions). The House report states:
Under existing law, the taxpayer may be whipsawed out of a deduction for
a bad debt because of the uncertainty as to the time at which the debt becomes
worthless. Later evidence often discloses that present decisions as to the year in
which a debt becomes worthless are erroneous. For example, the taxpayer
concludes that a debt has become bad and takes the deduction in that year, only
to discover by later evidence that the debt actually became worthless 3 years
previously. The statute of limitations having run on such previous year, this
deduction is lost forever to the taxpayer. Conversely, where the debt actually
became worthless in a year later than the year chosen by the taxpayer, the 3-year
statute of limitations may operate against the Government.
To relieve this inequitable situation, the bill replaces the present 3-year
statute of limitations in such cases with a 7-year statute, giving a considerably
greater flexibility to the allowance of bad debt deductions in the proper year.
Id.; see also Armstrong v. United States, 681 F.2d 774, 775-78 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (discussing
congressional intent in enacting § 6511(d)(1) and finding that section did not apply in case);
Indiana Nat'l Corp. v. United States, 980 F.2d 1098, 1100-02 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing and
approving Armstrong's analysis of congressional intent with respect to § 6511(d)(1)).
293. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine of equitable
tolling).
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These statutory constraints, however, should have no impact on the use

of equitable tolling under other compelling circumstances. For example,
fraud that conceals a taxpayer's right to a refund should toll the statute of

limitations, even in cases in which the defendant is not responsible for the
fraud. Thus, courts should permit taxpayers to invoke the doctrine of
equitable tolling in a case like Webb, in which taxes were paid fraudulently
and the taxpayer was physically prevented from learning of these payments.29
Courts should also permit claimants to invoke the doctrine of equitable

tolling in cases in which a taxpayer suffers from a debilitating mental
illness. 2' Thus, a taxpayer suffering from severe senile dementia should
not be penalized for failing to assert a refund claim within the statute of
limitations when that taxpayer lacked the cognitive ability to do so.296
Likewise, severe alcoholism or schizophrenia may justify the use of equitable tolling when the taxpayer is proved to be incompetent. 2'
Although the facts set forth in Webb, Brockamp, and other previously
discussed cases are extremely compelling, the range of cases in which
equitable tolling should be permitted defies enumeration. In those situations
in which the doctrine should apply, any burden imposed on the government

by allowing the statute of limitations to be equitably tolled will likely pale
in comparison to the harm a taxpayer will suffer if not permitted to assert
a claim for refund.29 Consequently, courts should be free to invoke the
294. See Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691, 692-93 (1995) (discussing situation in
which taxpayer was victimized by fraud), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S.
Feb. 23, 1996) (No. 95-1360).
295. See Stein, supra note 212, at 374 (arguing for application of equitable tolling in
cases involving mental illness).
296. See Brockamp v. United States, 67 F.3d 260, 263 (9th Cir. 1995) (tolling statute
of limitations in tax refund suit due to taxpayer's senility), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1875
(1996); see also First Interstate Bank of Nevada v. United States, 874 F. Supp. 286, 288-90
(D. Nev. 1994) (same); Johnsen v. United States, 758 F. Supp. 834, 835-36 (E.D.N.Y.
1991) (same).
297. See Scott v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 1499, 1504-08 (D. Haw. 1993) (finding
taxpayer's severe alcoholism equitably tolled statute of limitations), aft'd, 70 F.3d 120 (9th
Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Brockamp, 116 S. Ct. 1875 (1996);
Wiltgen v. United States, 813 F. Supp. 1387, 1389-96 (N.D. Iowa 1992) (tolling statute of
limitations due to taxpayer's schizophrenia).
298. See Webb, 66 F.3d at 702-03 (Russell, J., dissenting) (noting disparate positions
of taxpayers and government). In his dissent in Webb, Judge Russell noted:
The government can certainly afford to do the honorable thing in this case. To
the government, which deals with budgets of trillions of dollars, four million
dollars is just a drop in the bucket. Requiring the government to return the
money improperly collected from Parsons would not impose any burden on it.
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doctrine of equitable tolling in those cases that present persuasive equitable
considerations and that are not addressed by an enumerated statutory
exception.
VII. Conclusion
Prior to 1990, an individual asserting a time-barred claim for a tax
refund had little hope of ever obtaining relief, no matter how sympathetic
a court may have been to that individual's particular situation. 2' However,
since the Supreme Court's decision in Irwin v. Department of Veterans
Affairs," several courts have abandoned the traditional rejection of equitable tolling in tax refund suits and have applied the doctrine to provide relief
to individuals demonstrating persuasive equitable considerations 301 Although other courts have resisted this trend and have developed elaborate
legal theories to justify their position, these theories fail to address properly
both the legal arguments and the policy considerations supporting the use
of equitable tolling in tax refund suits." ° Consequently, when the Supreme
Court considers this issue, the Court should adopt the Ninth Circuit's
general approach in Brockamp that permits a claimant to invoke the doctrine
of equitable tolling when circumstances justify such a step. Admittedly,
those circumstances are limited, not only in order to give effect to the
statutory exceptions discussed above, but also because the statutes of
limitations in tax refund suits further several important policy considerations. Nevertheless, courts must be able to protect the rights of taxpayers
who, through no fault of their own, lack the ability to protect their own
rights. The doctrine of equitable tolling is an essential tool in helping
courts fulfill this important task.

Such an unbudgeted loss of revenues would destroy many corporations, but the
government would hardly be affected.
Id. at 703 (Russell, J., dissenting). The Ninth Circuit expressed a similar sentiment in
Brockamp and stated:
We think that the facts as alleged by Mrs. Brockamp demonstrate why equitable
tolling should apply in some tax cases. In this instance, it would be unconscionable to allow the government to retain money that it concedes it was not owed,
and may have only received due to a 93 year-old man's senility.
Brockamp, 67 F.3d at 263 (criticizing First Circuit's analysis in Oropallo).

299. See supra Part IV.A.
300. 498 U.S. 89 (1990).
301. See supra Part V.D.
302. See supra Part VI.B.

